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ABSTRACT
Using new public spending statistics for Spain and other various indica-
tors we show that Spain and Britain suffered larger increases in public
expenditure in the periods in which they fought each other and other coun-
tries. The British Exchequer spent much more than its Spanish counterpart,
especially on the Army and Navy and debt repayment. This situation helps to
explain why Britain emerged victorious against Spain in the majority of these
wars and was a consequence of the political and institutional changes made
in England from 1688 onwards, reducing budget constraint and allowing
Britain to mobilise the necessary resources to become the leading world
power. In Spain, however, the changes required to eliminate the country’s his-
tory of bankruptcies and increase its spending capacity were not made.
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3 For the statements of some of these authors see Ferguson (2001), p. 25.
RESUMEN
Utilizando unas nuevas series del gasto de la Hacienda española y algu-
nos otros indicadores se comprueba que España y Gran Bretaña sufrieron
grandes aumentos del gasto público en aquellos periodos en que guerrearon
entre sí y con otros países. El Estado británico gastó mucho más dinero que
el español, sobre todo en los capítulos militares y el servicio de la Deuda, lo
que contribuye a explicar por qué Gran Bretaña venció a España en la
mayoría de los conflictos que libraron ambos países. Esto era, en buena
parte, una consecuencia de los cambios políticos e institucionales llevados
a cabo en Inglaterra a fines del siglo XVII, que limitaron las restricciones pre-
supuestarias y facilitaron que Gran Bretaña llegara a ser la primera poten-
cia mundial, mientras que en España no se hicieron las transformaciones
necesarias para hacer olvidar su larga tradición de bancarrotas y aumentar
su capacidad de gasto.
Palabras clave: gasto público, gasto militar, presupuestos, capacidad de
gasto, Gran Bretaña y España (siglo XVIII)
1. INTRODUCTION
Military spending has generated much literature since Antiquity. As early
as the fifth century B.C., Thucydides understood the relationships between
expenditure and warfare and wrote that «war is a matter not so much of
arms as of money, which makes arms of use» 1. Several centuries later,
Cicero stated in his Fifth Philippic that nervus belli, pecuniam ad infinitum 2.
In the early modern period, this maxim was seen as unquestionable by
rulers such as Maria Theresa of Austria, statesmen like Richelieu, econo-
mists and men of letters such as Antoine de Montchrestien and writers like
Rabelais 3. The same can be said for the modern period and the present, so
it is hardly surprising that military spending has been the subject of consi-
derable scholarly attention in recent decades. Military expenditure is pro-
bably the major theme in the economics of military spending and defence
economics, a sub-area of economics whose origin can be traced back to
World War II. Researchers in defence economics and the economics of mili-
tary spending apply economic reasoning and methods to the study of issues
related with defence and conflict resolution: the economic effects of mili-
tary spending, arms races, the military-industrial complex, the procurement
of defence equipment, the arms trade, disarmament, conversion, the peace
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dividend, peace-keeping, and so on 4. Nevertheless, defence economics has
been, at least until the present, almost exclusively focused on the post-
Second World War period. Other works on military spending during the
modern period dealt with similar topics at the level of the international
system and alliances before and after the First World War 5.
Military outlays are also a very important topic in the extensive literatu-
re on the tax state or the fiscal-military state. The scholars of this note-
worthy research field study public finance in the early modern period and
its relationships with war finance, taxation, budget constraint, state buil-
ding, economic growth, etc. 6. It was Schumpeter (1918) who coined the
term «tax state» to indicate the significant step from the medieval «domain
state» to the modern form of the state. Seventy years later, John Brewer
(1988) was the first scholar to use the term «fiscal-military state» to high-
light that the main function of the British state in the eighteenth century
was to wage and finance warfare. From then on, the fiscal-military state
became a growing research field which has generated many publications 7.
In works on the tax state or fiscal-military states it is pointed out that war-
fare and the efforts made to finance it were highly influential factors in the
formation of European states during the early modern period. According to
Tilly (1992, p. 70), «major mobilizations for war provided the chief occa-
sions on which states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of
political organization». Thus, a centralized and productive fiscal system
began to emerge. The growing cost of armies and navies was a central rea-
son for the growth of expenditure and hence taxation and government debt,
especially from the seventeenth century onwards. It can be said, therefore,
that the needs of the war fuelled the state, determining taxation and public
debt and affecting the economy.
European states did not, however, have unlimited spending power and
suffered budgetary constraints generated by factors such as the sources of
revenue and the size and growth of their economies. Some states —such as
Holland and England— made political and institutional changes in order to
extend their spending capacity and so to be able to finance warfare. It seems
that other states —such as France— tried frequently, but unsuccessfully, to
implement financial innovations. What was the situation in Spain? Was
Spain able to set up a sufficiently solid fiscal and credit system to allow the
country to fight for world supremacy? To what extent could Spain rely on
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capital markets to finance the spikes in expenditure required by wars? We
hope, in this study, to contribute to answers these questions. The principal
aim of these pages, however, is to measure and compare, accurately and
systematically, the military impact and the spending capacity of Britain and
Spain during the eighteenth century. This comparison would not have been
possible without the new set of statistics of Spanish public expenditure
recently constructed (see Appendix). Four indicators based on these new
statistics and the series of Treasury spending, prices and population for
Britain compiled by Mitchell and Deane (1962) were constructed. First, the
contribution of military spending to the increase in total expenditure in the
periods in which the Exchequers of Britain and Spain spent most was cal-
culated. We also estimated the proportion of per capita expenditure devoted
to financing the military items of the budget. This makes it possible to dis-
cover whether the Army and Navy were the items on which the Spanish and
British National Treasuries spent most per head of population and whether
these sums rose throughout the eighteenth century. The third indicator esti-
mates the percentage of total expenditure dedicated to military items. We
also considered GDP, another point of reference commonly used to estima-
te the importance of military outlays. In spite of the fact that the calculation
of this macroeconomic variable for the early modern period is a hazardous
exercise, several estimates of both Spanish and British GDP and GDP per
head have been made 8. They present very different figures which show that
even though there has been much recent research leading to substantial
improvements in our knowledge of GDP of both countries, estimates of this
variable are closer to conjectures than definitive evidence 9.
Finally, in order to compare the budgetary impact of military expenditu-
re and the spending capacity of Great Britain and Spain accurately, the
accounting units of both countries were unified using eighteenth-century
rates of exchange for the pound sterling and the real of vellón. The term
«purchasing power parity» (PPP) was coined in the twentieth century to
identify the relationship between exchange rates and price levels, although
the perception that exchange rates should be related to national price levels
has been dated back to the sixteenth century. PPP states that the exchange
rate between two currencies should be that which would equate the relati-
ve national prices if expressed in a common currency 10. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence in favour of PPP is not very strong, and there is research
reporting that this method sometimes fails to hold. Several explanations for
this apparent failure have been offered. Some stem from economic consi-
derations, i.e., the use of non tradable goods in the construction of price
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indices and speculation regarding foreign exchange rates. Others stem from
the difficulties in the empirical analysis —the use of short data series una-
ble to capture the statistical properties of deviations from PPP, for exam-
ple—, and some from policy variables, such as the varying degree of exchan-
ge rate management implied by the regimes 11. In spite of these difficulties,
PPP has been used fruitfully in both theoretical and empirical research on
exchange rates 12. Additionally, we have a reliable source at our disposal, The
Course of the Exchange, a periodical which offered plentiful financial and
commercial data, and for this reason has been used by numerous scholars
to study many issues related to eighteenth-century finance and commerce,
including those relating to the PPP method.
This article is divided into five parts. Following this theoretical and
methodological introduction, in the second section we will study the bud-
getary impact of military spending in both Spain and Britain by estimating
the contribution of Army and Navy expenditure to the increase in total
spending. The third section will discuss the economic and Treasury impacts
of military outlays and the budget priorities of British and Spanish rulers
by calculating the weight of Army and Navy spending in several variables.
In the fourth section we will debate budget constraint and examine the
spending capacity of Great Britain and Spain. In the last section the main
findings will be summarized highlighting the similarities and differences
between Britain and Spain, and their implications for further research.
2. THE INCREASE OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ITS
FINANCING
2.1. The contribution of military spending to the increase of public
expenditure
Britain’s Treasury spending increased considerably throughout the eigh-
teenth century. In inflation-adjusted prices, its cumulative growth rate was
1.47 from 1714 onwards. The increase was greater in the second half of the
century than in the first half. It was not until 1740 that total expenditure
reached an average of seven million pounds sterling. In the 1760s, it went
beyond 13 million pounds, passing 17 million in the 1780s and 24 million
during the last decade of the century. In Spain, real public expenditure rose
much less than in Great Britain, its cumulative growth rate being 0.46.
Between 1714 and 1720 expenditure amounted to 189 million reales de
vellón and more than 200 million during the next seventy years. In the
1790s, expenditure exceeded the 330 million reales de vellón mark. The
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expenditure trends were similar in Great Britain and in Spain with particu-
larly noteworthy increases in expenditure taking place in five periods of the
century with four of these periods coinciding for both countries (see
Figures 1 and 2).
The first peak in British Treasury spending took place between 1703 and
1713, when expenses doubled the totals of the previous years. A little more
than 15 per cent of this increase was caused by civil budget items, especially
the service of the National Debt. Military items generated most of the incre-
ase, which was due to the involvement of Britain in the War of the Spanish
Succession. Army expenditure contributed almost three-fifths of the incre-
ase in total expenditure, while Navy expenditure accounted for a quarter. In
Spain, the first peak in Treasury spending occurred in the period 1717-1720,
when annual expenses increased 23 per cent in relation to previous years.
Less than a quarter of this increase was caused by the civil items of the bud-
get. As occurred in Britain, the majority of the rise in expenses in Spain was
due to spending on military items. The cost of the Army contributed more
than half of the increase, while the percentage attributable to the Navy was
almost 25 per cent, as shown in Table 1. The increase during the period
1717-1720 and the others which took place in the first half of the eighteenth
century (for instance, that of the period 1728-1736, when the Spanish
Treasury spent, on average, 17 per cent more than in the seven preceding
FIGURE 1
GREAT BRITAIN’S TREASURY SPENDING, 1714-1800
(Annual values in million pounds sterling at constant prices)
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Sources: The author’s own preparation based on Mitchell and Deane (1962).
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years) were caused by the wars following Philip V’s refusal to accept the tre-
aties of Utrecht. This King’s foreign policy involved attempts to regain the
territories lost during the War of Spanish Succession, especially those in
Italy. In 1717 and 1718 Spanish troops conquered Sardinia and Sicily, but
Britain, France, Austria and the Netherlands formed an alliance and ejected
Spain from these territories before 1720 13.
The second huge increase in Treasury spending in both Spain and Britain
took place during the 1740s. In Great Britain, expenses increased by almost
two-thirds between 1731-1739 and 1740-1748. This increment was caused in
its entirety by the military items of the budget. Army expenditure contributed
almost three-fifths of the rise in expenditure and Navy spending more than
two-fifths. The service of the National Debt made up 1.5 per cent of the incre-
ase, and the rest of the civil items accounted for a negative percentage. The
funding of the War of Jenkins’s Ear and the War of Austrian Succession cau-
sed these increases. These wars, especially the latter, were also the most
important factors behind the increase Spain’s public spending between 1742
and 1746. Treasury payments during this period rose, on an average annual
rate, by 40 per cent in relation to the previous five years. Civil items made up
FIGURE 2
SPAIN’S TREASURY SPENDING, 1714-1800
(Annual values in million reales of vellón at constant prices)
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Sources: The author’s own preparation based on Jurado-Sánchez (2006).
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less than two-fifths of the increase, whereas more than three-fifths was due to
military spending. On this occasion the Navy played the largest role in the
increase, doubling its expenditure and accounting for more than four-fifths of
the increase, while Army spending decreased by more than 15 per cent.
Another peak in Spanish and British Treasury spending occurred in
1756-1763 and again the increases were caused largely by a tense interna-
tional situation. In Britain, the impact of military outlays on the Treasury
was again greater than in Spain. After eleven years of armed peace in
Europe, from 1748 onwards, military operations returned to both the Old
and the New World as a result of the Seven Years War. This military conflict
caused 95 per cent of the increase in public spending in Great Britain. The
financing of the Army made up more than three-fifths of the increase of
total expenditure, while that of the Navy contributed one-third of the total
increase in expenses. Servicing the National Debt accounted for more than
4 per cent with other civil items making up the rest. Spain entered the Seven
Years War in 1761, during the final stages, a circumstance that Britain used
to enhance its victory. As a result of this war, the Spanish Exchequer spent
48 per cent more in 1759-1762 than in the preceding ten years. Two-fifths of
this rise was due to Army and Navy expenditure and almost three-fifths to
civil items. This was the only period in which the civil items of the budget
played a larger part in the increase than military items, a situation which
was probably due to the brief Spanish involvement in the war and to the rise
in expenditure of several civil items.
Most of the increases in public expenditure which took place in Spain
and Great Britain between 1776 and 1783 were also caused by the wars
which broke out during this period. We refer in particular to the War of
Independence of the United States of America. British Exchequer spending
doubled between 1768-1775 and 1776-1783. Army spending accounted for
more than half of the increase and spending on the Navy more than one-
third. The cost of the service of the National Debt made up almost 10 per
cent of the increase. The financing of the involvement of Spain in the War
of Independence contributed considerably to pushing up expenditure in the
early 1780s. Another contributing factor was the Spanish Navy’s attack on
Algiers to prevent Algerian raids on Spain’s southern coasts. In this period,
the Spanish Treasury spent almost two-fifths more than in the previous ten
years. More than half of this increase was due to the Army and Navy, espe-
cially the latter, which accounted for 43 per cent of the rise because the
majority of the battles in the above-mentioned wars were naval conflicts.
Almost half of the increase was caused by the civil items, to a large extent
due to the service of the National Debt. The notable contribution of this
item was caused by the first repayments on vales reales, a hybrid of war
bond and paper money issued from 1780, in part to finance the war against
Britain, which increased the amount required to service the National Debt
by a factor of 2.6 in the next three years.
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The last spending peak of the Spanish and British National Treasuries
occurred between 1792 and 1800. The expenses of the British Exchequer
grew by almost 64 per cent, almost two-thirds of this increase being genera-
ted by the financing of the Army, plus almost another third by the financing
of the Navy, and almost 5 per cent by the service of the National Debt. In
Spain, Treasury spending also peaked in the same period. The sum paid by
the Exchequer was, on an average annual rate, 42 per cent greater than in the
five-year period of 1786-1790. A little over three-quarters of this increase was
due to military items of the budget. Army spending accounted for 56 per cent
of the increase in expenditure as a result of the Pyrenees War, a land war in
which Spain and France fought from 1793 to 1795. Navy spending made up
less than one-fifth of the increase, as a result of the fact that military conflicts
with Britain from 1797 onwards were largely naval. As regards civil expenses,
they accounted for almost a quarter of the total increase in expenditure, half
of this percentage corresponding to the service of the National Debt. It was
once again the repayment of the vales reales which pushed up (up to 70 per
cent) the level of this item. On average, the Exchequer paid off yearly vales to
the value of 17 million reales in 1786-1794, and 83 million in 1795-1800.
If we consider the five periods in which increases in expenditure were
greatest jointly, we can see that the impacts of various items of the budget
on Treasury spending were different in Great Britain and in Spain. As
shown in Figure 3, in Britain the impact of military spending was much gre-
FIGURE 3
THE CONTRIBUTION ON MILITARY ITEMS TO THE INCREASE 
OF EXPENDITURE, 1700-1800*
(In percentages of increase)
100
80
60
40
20
0
Great Britain
Army
Navy
Debt
The other
civil irems
Total military
spending
Spain
Sources: The author’s computations based on Mitchell and Deane (1962) and Jurado-Sánchez (2006).
Notes: * For Spain, 1714-1800.
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ased public spending.
ater than in Spain, while in Spain the impact of civil items was greater than
in Britain. In this country, almost 93 per cent of the increase in expenditu-
re was caused by the military items of the budget, whose contribution went
from 84 per cent in 1703-1713 to 100 per cent in 1740-1748 and 96 per cent
in 1792-1800. Army spending made up almost three-fifths of this contribu-
tion, and spending on the Navy accounted for a little over one-third. In
Spain, three-fifths of the increase was brought about by the need to finan-
ce the Army (one-quarter) and the Navy (more than one-third). This avera-
ge annual percentage was even greater in 1717-1720 and 1792-1800, periods
in which military outlays made up 75 per cent of increase in expenditure.
As for the civil items, these accounted for two-fifths of the increase, almost
14 per cent of it being due to the service of the National Debt. In Britain,
civil spending contributed to the increase in total expenditure far less than
in Spain (just over 7 per cent) almost all of which was made up by debt
repayment.
2.2. The factors of financing of the increase in public spending
Did the conflicts between Britain, Spain and other countries, in fact,
raise the volume of spending permanently to a higher level? Which factors
contributed to finance the increase in public expenditure? As far as the first
question is concerned, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) prove that in the twen-
tieth century public spending in the United Kingdom grew during wartime
and never returned to its pre-war levels. This phenomenon, in which, firstly,
expenses increased because of the financing of the wars, and later, when the
conflicts finished, the increment continued due to debt servicing and other
necessities caused by wars, is known as the «ratchet effect». Can the same
thing be said for eighteenth-century Britain and Spain? All of the rises in
British public spending are due primarily to a large increase in military
outlays. Debt repayment, used to finance military needs, increased towards
the end of each war and is maintained in the first years of peace. On the
conclusion of a war, the increasing debt repayment line crosses the military
line coming down, exceeding it by a rising margin each time 14 (Figure 4).
In Spain the service of the National Debt line never exceeded the military
spending line (Figure 5), and total civil expenditure only exceeded military
outlays in three years in the 1760s.
The large increases in public expenditure caused by the considerable
financial requirements of the foreign policies of both British and Spanish
rulers during the eighteenth century could only be satisfied by either large
increases in tax revenue, or the issue of National Debt, or both. In Britain,
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FIGURE 4
THE «RATCHET EFFECT» IN BRITAIN’S TREASURY SPENDING, 1700-1800
(Annual values in million pounds sterling at constant prices)
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Military expenditure
The Service of the N. Debt
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Sources: The author’s own preparation based on Mitchell and Deane (1962).
FIGURE 5
THE «RATCHET EFFECT» IN SPAIN’S TREASURY SPENDING, 1714-1800
(Annual values in million reales of vellón at constant prices)
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Sources: The author’s own preparation based on Jurado-Sánchez (2006).
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pp. 79-83, and Fernández-Albaladejo (1979) pp. 54-57 and 77-83.
16 Engerman and O’Brien (2004), pp. 451-57. Crafts (1985), p. 45.
17 Anes (1970), pp. 427-30. Fernández-Díaz (1985), pp. 17-53. Marcos-Martín (2000),
pp. 650-70.
18 O’Brien (1988), pp. 6-8.
19 Archivo General de Palacio, Administrativa, legajo 539.
20 Archivo General de Simancas, Dirección General del Tesoro, Inventario, 16, Guión, 23, le-
gajo 49.
net fiscal income grew in real terms by a factor of 3, while in Spain fiscal
income rose 126 per cent between 1713 and 1742 15. Several factors lay
behind these increases. One factor was the positive evolution of the econo-
mies of both countries. Reconstructed estimates for the growth rates of
total output suggest that Britain’s real national income may have increased
by a factor of around 3 during the eighteenth century 16. In Spain, the crisis
of the seventeenth century ended around the middle of this century, reco-
very beginning around 1680. This recovery, however, was halted by the War
of Spanish Succession. After the war, both population and farming output
grew strongly over the following decades. Owing to the increase in demand
and to the affordable prices of foodstuffs and land to rent, the output of
industry and domestic and foreign trade also grew 17.
Another factor which contributed to the growth of public revenue was
the successful administrative management of the tax system. In Britain,
this factor might have been even more important than economic
growth 18. In Spain, a notable part of the increase in revenue was due to
the reforms which, from 1714 onwards, introduced a set of new direct
taxes (the equivalentes) levied on production factors in Aragon in order to
bring them into line with Castilian taxes. If economic growth and tax
reforms did not yield enough money to fund the wars, British and
Spanish rulers appealed for credit and, in the case of the Spanish, left a
legacy of debt. The size of Britain’s National Debt jumped from one
million pounds sterling in 1688 to 244 million pounds in 1790. This enor-
mous increase was the result of a variety of institutional innovations esta-
blished after the Glorious Revolution (see section 4). In Spain, the impor-
tance of the National Debt was far less than in Britain. Philip V of Spain
(1701-1746) left more than 500 million reales undischarged, the so-called
créditos de testamentaría 19. Government debt increased considerably in
the last decades of the century. The Exchequer raised 725 million reales in
the first three years of the 1780s by means of the issue of vales reales 20.
So, Spain was able to obtain the additional revenue with which to fund
the wars of this decade, since there were no fiscal reforms and the eco-
nomy stagnated from the mid 1760s. Twenty years later, Spain’s economy
entered a crisis, coinciding with a peak in Treasury spending as a result
of the wars against France and Britain. The agrarian crisis and a sharp
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rise in farming prices caused problems for industry as manufactured pro-
duction could not continue to grow if the vast majority of the population
spent its disposable income on purchasing food supplies. Trade also decli-
ned in the 1790s, since a succession of wars interrupted commerce during
the next 15 years. This increase in public expenditure could only be finan-
ced by another huge issue of National vales reales of almost 1,000 million
reales in the second half of the 1790s, double the figure of a few years ear-
lier.
3. ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION OF ARMY AND NAVY SPENDING
IN SEVERAL ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VARIABLES
Due to the difficulties involved in estimating GDP for the early modern
period, it is not easy to determine the weight of military outlays in this
aggregate variable accurately. Nevertheless, the available estimates of
Spanish and British GDP and the calculations of Army and Navy spending
for both countries presented in these pages show that the military burdens
on GDP were higher in Britain than in Spain. During the second half of the
eighteenth century, in Spain the financing of the Army and Navy absorbed,
on average, 7 per cent of GDP, while in Britain the average percentage was
almost 9 per cent. These percentages are much higher than the figures for
the period 1870-1913, when the military burdens were 2 per cent of GDP in
Spain and 2.6 in Britain 21. The differences between the two countries are
larger if military spending and debt repayment are considered jointly. The
sum paid by the British Exchequer for both budgetary items accounted for
more than 16 per cent of GDP and GDP per capita, double the figure spent
by the Spanish Exchequer (see Table 2).
Also, in Spain, public expenditure and military spending per capita were
far lower than in Britain. The growth rate of Britain’s Treasury spending
was far greater than that of the population. Both variables reached seven
million in the 1710s, but in the last decade of the century the former incre-
ased by a factor of 3.5 to 24 million and the latter grew by less than 50 per
cent to ten million. Therefore, expenditure per head of population suffered
a sharp increase. The British Exchequer spent one pound sterling per head
of population in the 1710s and almost two and half pounds in the 1790s
(Table 3). In Spain, per capita expenditure rose by almost a quarter. The
population increased, averaging out different estimates, by 42 per cent,
while public spending increased by 76 per cent. In the period 1712-1717, the
Spanish Exchequer spent 24 reales for each inhabitant and more than 30 in
1797.
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The Spanish and British Exchequers spent the majority of per capita
expenditure on military items, but there were large differences between the
situations in both countries. The British Army and Navy absorbed, on an
annual average, 55 per cent of per capita expenditure (almost one pound
sterling), and the proportion of both military items was similar: 28 per cent
of expenditure per head of population was spent on the Army, while a little
over a quarter was spent on the Navy. Repayment of debt was the item on
which the British National Treasury spent most per head of population
(more than one-third). On the contrary, the British Exchequer spent smaller
amounts per capita on the other civil items (10 per cent). In Spain, the
weight of military spending in per capita expenditure was far greater than
in Britain, but that of servicing the National Debt was far less than that of
Britain. Almost two-thirds of per capita expenditure (17 reales) were spent
on the Army and Navy. In contrast with the large sums spent on military
items, the Spanish Treasury spent, on average, smaller amounts per capita
on civil expenses (a little over nine reales, more than one-third) (Table 3 and
Figure 6).
As shown in Table 4, the structure of expenditure also shows the heavy
burden that the Army and Navy represented for both the Spanish and
British National Budgets during the eighteenth century. In Britain, 55 per
cent of expenditure was allocated to funding the Army and Navy. This ave-
FIGURE 6
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE, 1711-1797 *
(In percentages of total)
50
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Great Britain
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The Service
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Sources: The author’s computations based on references cited in Appendix and Table 3.
Notes: * For Spain, 1714-1800.
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rage percentage rose considerably in the first decade of the 1700s, the 1740s
and the 1790s. The budgetary importance of the Army was greater than that
of the Navy, since the former absorbed 30 per cent of total spending and the
latter a quarter. The service of the National Debt was the most important
item of the British budget, absorbing more than one-third of expenditure.
The considerable weight of military spending in the structure of expenditu-
re is also observable in Spain, but the importance of the service of the
National Debt was a lot lower than in Great Britain, as it accounted for 7
per cent of total Spanish spending. More than three-fifths of Spain’s
Treasury spending was allocated to financing the Army and the Navy. This
average percentage rose considerably between 1714 and 1740 and in the
1770s. The Army was the most important item of the budget, since it absor-
bed more than two-fifths of total expenditure and more than two-thirds of
military spending. Nevertheless, the trend of the budgetary weight of the
Army fell, as shown by its negative average annual rate of growth. Army
spending grew significantly more in Britain than in Spain over the eighte-
enth century.
Unlike the Army, the Spanish Navy gained in budgetary importance over
the eighteenth century. Its costs grew rapidly. The average annual amount
spent on the Navy (a little over one-fifth of total expenditure) rose from the
1740s onwards, except during the 1760s. The growth of Navy spending was
due to the numerous naval wars in which Spain participated and the buil-
ding of large fleets for warfare. According to Ardant (1975), this was usual
in eighteenth-century Europe. In Spain, two ministers, Patiño and
Ensenada, encouraged increased spending on the fleet during the first half
of eighteenth century in order to make Spain the major world power once
again, as she had been in the sixteenth century. This policy meant that dock-
yards launched one hundred boats between 1717 and 1752 and Navy expen-
diture exceeded that of the Army by 70 per cent in 1744-1746 and by 25 per
cent in 1747. The growth of the Spanish fleet continued in the following
decades reaching the figure of more than two hundred ships by the end of
the century 22.
The Navy was more prominent in the structure of expenditure in Britain
than in Spain, but spending on the Navy increased more in Spain than in
Britain. This shows that the Spanish Exchequer spent more on the Navy in
an attempt to reduce the advantage that its greater naval power afforded
Britain. However, the strength of Spanish naval power does not appear to
come any closer to Britain’s, since Britain spent more (25 per cent of total
expenditure) than Spain (21 per cent) and Britain had a more powerful
Navy than Spain or any other European country. During the major wars of
the eighteenth century, Britain had many more warships than any other
world power. For instance, in the War of Austrian Succession, Britain had
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115 ships of the line, 82 more than the Netherlands, 70 more than France,
79 more than Spain, and 95 more than Russia. This gap narrowed in the
second half of the eighteenth century, but the differences were still remar-
kable. In the years of the War of Independence of the United States, Britain
had 30, 48 and 89 ships of the line more than France, Spain and Russia res-
pectively, and 58, 64 y 71 more during the French Revolutionary Wars.
Ships, however, are of little value if there is a shortage of crew. For this rea-
son, Britain also massively increased the number of seaman. British naval
personnel grew by a factor of almost seven between the end of the War of
the Spanish Succession and the French Revolutionary Wars, when the num-
ber of sailors exceeded 92,000 23.
The data on the structure of public spending may encourage economic
historians to explore other interesting issues. One such issue involves the
possibility of a «guns versus butter» theory in eighteenth-century Spain and
Britain. This theory is the classic example of the production possibility fron-
tier. It models the relationship between a country’s investment in defence
and civilian goods. A nation has to choose between two options when spen-
ding its finite resources. It can buy either guns or butter, or a combination
of both. It seems that if an economy produces more guns (military expen-
diture) it must reduce its production of butter (civil spending) and vice
versa. From the defence spending perspective, the impact and possibility of
a guns vs. butter dilemma during the twentieth century has received subs-
tantial coverage in academic literature. In short, this dilemma expresses the
idea that a percentage increase in social spending is accompanied by a pro-
portional decrease in military spending and vice versa. Nevertheless, the
existence of budgetary tradeoffs seems to be at best only partially suppor-
ted in the empirical literature 24. As far as we know, there are no studies of
the existence of the guns vs. butter dilemma during the eighteenth century.
Therefore, this is an issue for future economic history research to explore.
It is hoped that further investigation may prove the existence of the trade-
offs between military spending and other kinds of expenses, and if so, whe-
ther they favoured Britain or Spain in the pursuit of their economic and
military objectives.
4. SPENDING CAPACITY AND BUDGET CONSTRAINT. THE GREAT
ADVANTAGE OF BRITAIN
The eighteenth century was an age of warfare as a result of the struggle
for economic and political world primacy which several countries were
engaged in throughout the century. Britain’s ambition was to become the
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leading world power. The aim of old powers like Spain and France was, at
least, to maintain their status. We must also take into account the appea-
rance of Russia on the European scene and the arrival of Prussia among the
group of great military powers 25. In the pursuit of their objectives, the
governments of these countries tried to gather resources on a large-scale.
However, the European states of the time, like households and firms, did
not have unlimited spending power. Government expenditure was constrai-
ned by total receipts obtained by taxation or borrowing from the public. In
turn, these sources of revenue were limited not only by the size of taxable
object less the subsistence minimum, but also by the nature of the driving
forces of the economy (Schumpeter, 1918). According to Collins (1988,
p. 219), in seventeenth-century France there was a «fiscal limit» of some 30-
35 million livres for the levy of the taille, imposed by the nature of the tax
and the productive wealth upon which it was levied.
To reduce budget constraints and extend their spending capacity, several
states had long since introduced political and institutional changes. In the
1540s the provincial Estates of Holland started to levy efficient provincial
taxes to be able to meet the financial costs of long-term public loans. In the
following decade, all forced loans were abolished and a voluntary, free mar-
ket for public loans emerged. Dutch public credit was maintained by an ins-
titutional web which included an efficient tax system, voluntary public
loans and a mature stock market (supported by the Bank of Amsterdam). As
a result, the province of Holland became an efficient entity able to mobili-
se funds for the wars against Spain (Hart, 2007). A comparable financial
revolution occurred in England during the last years of the seventeenth cen-
tury. Between the 1690s and the middle of the eighteenth century, a move
away from short-term loans to regular long-term arrangements in public
finance took place. A permanent national public debt was created because
it established property rights and obtained the political commitment of the
state, controlled by the parliament, to defray payment of the debt, sustain
the institutions that underpinned it (the Bank of England) and respect for
the investors who financed it. On the basis of institutional and political cre-
dibility, the British state proved highly successful in mobilising massive,
cheap loans for war (Dickson, 1967). The English financial revolution gene-
rated what has been called «the square of power», consisting of a parlia-
ment (for credible tax backing of the debt), a tax bureaucracy (to collect the
taxes needed to service the debt), a central bank (to maintain the market
value of the debt), and the national debt (to finance wars). The effectiveness
of the power emanating from this base was considerable, war being the
prime mover forcing countries to adopt whatever elements of the «square
of power» they could (Ferguson, 2001, pp. 15-16).
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It has been observed that the different national success stories in the
eighteenth century depended on the adoption of a financial revolution like
the English and the Dutch. Success, therefore, depended on the degree of
flexibility that states showed in obtaining the necessary resources to wage
increasingly costly wars. In the early modern period, warfare could not be
financed in the traditional medieval way, i.e. by increases in taxation. Tax-
smoothing was necessary, which meant borrowing during wartime and
managing the debt in peacetime. In the long run, the relationship between
fiscal resources and probity and a capacity for effective action in the inter-
national sphere prevailed (O’Brien and Hunt, 1999). Britain, France and
Holland in the second half of the eighteenth century can be seen as exam-
ples. As a result of its long record of fiscal probity, Britain could continue to
borrow a substantial fraction of its war expenditures at what were relatively
low interest rates. France, on the other hand, had to depend on taxation
since she had squandered her fiscal reputation from the 1770s onwards
(Bordo and White, 1991). According to Ferguson (2001, p. 180), the key dif-
ference between France and Britain was a matter of institutions. Britain
had a superior revenue-collecting system, a representative government,
which tended to draw up transparent budgets and reduced the likelihood of
default, a National Debt on which payments were generally made and was
transparently managed, and a central bank which guaranteed the converti-
bility of the currency into gold and reduced the risk of default as a result of
inflation. These institutions enabled Britain to sustain a much larger
debt/GDP ratio than France because they ensured that the interest Britain
paid on her debt was substantially less than what France paid on hers. In
the Netherlands of the 1780s, the willingness to invest in state bonds had
declined and defeat in the Anglo-Dutch war, coupled with a political crisis,
weakened the revenue-raising system established in the sixteenth century
(Hart, 2007).
According to North and Weingast (1989), French public finance did not
undergo the transformations experienced in England and the Netherlands.
French governments proved either incapable of implementing financial
innovations or simply abandoned them. The same can be said for Spain
where, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, no financial revolu-
tion along English or Dutch lines took place. Tax and administrative
reforms of the eighteenth century either achieved efficient institutional
change, which could lead to limited and more costly access to national and
international credit markets, seriously restricting Spain’s spending capacity
and hence eroding her possibilities of defeating Britain. In addition, it
seems that eighteenth-century Spanish statesmen lived with the worry
about how to pay back debt and the desire not to generate any more. This
public-debt aversion prevented any reasonable debt market from being set
up (González Enciso, 2007). Also, it has been argued that Spain was a poor
country whose weak economy never possessed enough human and material
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also Bernal (2005).
resources to maintain its Empire, and that if she managed to do so during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was due to the fact that Spain was
able to gather and channel men, money, technology, weapons and warships
from other peoples and territories. However, in the eighteenth century
changes in the international situation prevented the access of Spain to
foreign resources 26. Given that in this century, in spite of economic growth,
the presumption is that Spain’s resources remained inadequate to maintain
her empire, we believe, then, that it would have been very difficult for Spain
to contend world primacy with Britain. We consider that, besides these fac-
tors, the Spanish state had a long history of defaults which could have res-
tricted its access to credit markets. The Spanish Exchequer declared the
crown insolvent or suspended payments on several occasions during the
early modern period (1557, 1598, 1607, 1647, 1652, 1662, 1739...). Default
and the premium paid on a history of default were to become critical fea-
tures in the later stages. The Spanish state could not fail to make payments
on a frequent basis without a ruinous loss to its reputation at home and
abroad, and therefore weakening her ability to borrow in the future. It
would appear that, in the eighteenth century, Spain was unable to pass the
real test which consisted of mobilising sufficient resources for war and,
hence, to become the leading world power. This test involved the capacity
of government to borrow and the interaction between the constraints on
borrowing and the power to tax.
It seems that all these facts generated a budgetary inadequacy in Spain
which prevented the country from gaining world supremacy. The compara-
tive figures between Britain and Spain serve to corroborate the budgetary
inferiority of the Spanish Exchequer with respect to its British counterpart.
If we unify the accounting units of both countries and use only the Spanish
currency (the real of vellón), the large differences between Great Britain and
Spain, not only in terms of the impact of military expenditure on treasury
spending, but also in the spending capacity of both countries, become clear.
On an average annual rate, the British Exchequer spent five times more
than its Spanish counterpart in the 87 years following the War of the
Spanish Succession. This difference became even greater in the last two
decades of the century, when public spending in reales was almost eight
times higher in Great Britain than in Spain. The expenditure of the Spanish
state reached its highest level in the 1730s (37 per cent of that of the British)
and the lowest in the 1780s and the 1790s (13 per cent), precisely the deca-
des when Britain gained the upper hand in its rivalry with France and Spain
to achieve world supremacy. The same conclusion is reached if the volume
and trend of military spending and the service of the National Debt in both
countries are compared. As regards the former, the Exchequer of Britain
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ding capacity of Spain and Britain on the occasion of the American War of Independence.
spent more than four and half times the sum spent by its Spanish counter-
part, with the largest differences being recorded in the second half of the
eighteenth century, during the period in which both countries fought seve-
ral wars. The Spanish Exchequer reached the highest percentage in the
twenty-five year period following the War of the Spanish Succession, a
period in which it spent three-fifths of Great Britain’s military expenditure
on the Army and Navy. Spain fell further behind from the 1740s onwards,
especially during the decades in which Spain and Britain were at war, and
again the lowest level was reached in the 1790s. We can obtain a better idea
of Britain’s budgetary supremacy by comparing figures concerning the ser-
vice of the National Debt of both countries. On average, in Spain this item
did not even reach 4 per cent of the British figure with the highest percen-
tage being recorded in the 1740s (almost 8.5 per cent) (Table 5).
The per capita expenditure in reales and the contribution of military
outlays to the increase in expenditure also show the great advantage that
Britain enjoyed in spending capacity in comparison with Spain. In 1714-
1800, the contribution of the Spanish population to total expenditure and
military spending was, on average, 26 and 19 reales respectively. These figu-
res were less than 15 and 19 per cent of the contribution of the British popu-
lation, percentages which were to fall, especially in the last decade of the
century, when they were about 11 per cent (Table 6). However, the differen-
ce between the efforts made by the British and Spanish to finance wars was
not as great as shown by these percentages. The 97 reales paid, on average,
by each Briton represented 9 per cent of per capita income, while the 19 rea-
les paid by each Spaniard were almost 7 per cent of GDP per head. This was
due to the fact that real Spanish GDP and real GDP per capita were about
half and one-quarter respectively of those of Britain (Table 2).
Great Britain’s budgetary superiority during the great wars in which
Britain and Spain fought during the eighteenth century is clear. The British
Exchequer’s spending increased between six and fourteen times more than
that of Spain (six times during the War of Jenkins’s Ear and the War of the
Austrian Succession and fourteen times during the French Revolutionary
Wars). British superiority on the battlefield was even greater than these
figures show, since 90 per cent of the increase in public spending was due
to the financing of the Army and Navy, while in Spain this percentage was
about two-thirds. Spanish spending on the Army and Navy was between 10
and 20 times less than Britain’s during the aforementioned wars, reaching
the latter percentage during the Seven Years War and the former during the
War of Austrian Succession (Table 7) 27. These figures not only help to
explain why Great Britain emerged victorious against Spain in the majority
of the wars of the eighteenth century, but they also reflect the heavy burden
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that the numerous conflicts represented not only on the Spanish and British
National Treasuries and GDP, but also in many other European countries 28.
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA TREASURY EXPENDITURE, 1714-1800
Total Total per capita Per capita Military
expenditure* Population** expediture Spending***
Britain Spain Britain Spain Britain Spain Britain Spain
1714-1720 663.97 189.02 7.07 7.75 93.91 24.41 34.99 19.14
1751-1770 1,192.85 231.26 7.59 9.46 157.16 24.47 89.81 13.80
1781-1790 1,797.25 260.18 9.21 10.75 195.14 24.21 95.76 14.43
1791-1800 2,854.13 333.27 10.19 11.00 280.19 30.34 169.82 19.09
1714-1800 181.60 25.86 97.6 16.62
Sources: The author’s computations based on Mitchell and Deane (1962), Jurado-Sánchez (2006),
Livi-Bacci (1978), Nadal (1984), Eiras-Roel (1990), Bustelo (1993), and Pérez Moreda (1997).
Notes:
* Annual average in millions of reales of vellón at constant prices.
** Average in millions of inhabitants, according to several estimates made for Spain and Britain (see
Table 3).
*** Average in reales of vellón.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Public spending trends and the factors involved in its financing were
similar in Great Britain and Spain during the eighteenth century. Both
countries suffered large increases in expenditure in the periods in which
they fought each other and other countries. Therefore, rivalry between
Spain and Britain was a highly influential key factor in the volume and
structure of public expenditure in both countries. The spending capacity of
Britain was far greater than that of Spain: the British Exchequer spent five
times more than its Spanish counterpart and the growth rate of total expen-
diture was three times greater in Britain than in Spain. Furthermore, in
Spain the level of expenditure per head of population was only 14 per cent
of the British figure. The level of Spain’s military spending was a little over
one-fifth of Britain’s and that of the National Debt was less than 4 per cent
of Britain’s. The effort made by the British economy and population to
finance war was greater than those made by Spain. The financing of the
Army and Navy absorbed 9 per cent of British GDP and per capita income
(more than 16 per cent if the service of the National Debt is included). In
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Spain, these percentages were almost 7 and 8 per cent respectively. These
differences explain why Great Britain defeated Spain in the majority of
these wars and are probably the result of the English financial revolution
which took place at the end of the seventeenth century. Britain was able to
mobilise the necessary resources to become the leading world power, while
Spanish governments did not introduce enough political and institutional
changes to eliminate the country’s history of defaults and increase its spen-
ding capacity. This article opens the door for further significant studies in
economic history, two of them being the examination of the economic
effects of public spending and the exploration of the existence of the guns
vs. butter tradeoffs in the Spanish and British National Treasuries during
the eighteenth century.
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APPENDIX
There is no doubt that if primary source material is consulted during
research into economic history, it is crucial to carry out source criticism to
check its reliability and suitability for the investigation in question. There are
four types of archival sources containing data to estimate the volume and
structure of Spanish government spending during the eighteenth century:
1. Reports on the situation of the National Treasury made by the senior
officials of the Exchequer.
2. Financial summaries, statements and estimates issued by several fis-
cal bodies.
3. The accounts of the Tesorería General and the Tesorería Mayor, the
central treasuries of the Exchequer which managed and centralised
revenue and expenses.
4. The accounts of the Tesorería General and the Tesorería Mayor super-
vised by the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, the auditing body of the
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State Treasury which was under the obligation to give the accounts
the final approval.
Sources 3 and 4 present great advantages over the others for estimating
annual public outlays. Firstly, they contain reliable yearly data pertaining to
the whole of the eighteenth century which were generated by the same fis-
cal body for the same aim, i.e. to present public accounts. The other sour-
ces only contain data for some periods of this century and were generated
by diverse institutions for various purposes. Secondly, sources 3 and 4 con-
tain records of actual expenditures, while the other sources contain estima-
tes of spending. Finally, source 4 presents a valuable additional advantage
in relation to source 3: the revisions by the Contaduría were final and set-
tled the accounts. Sources 1 to 4 have been used by a number of scholars to
estimate Spanish public expenditure. The most plausible of the estimates
were made between 1969 and 2006, when several Treasury scholars publis-
hed seven series of statistics. Henry Kamen (1969) constructed a series for
the years 1703-18 using, at least in part, source 4. Didier Ozanam (1978)
made another estimate by consulting source 2, in this case for nine years of
the period 1723-60. José P. Merino (1981, 1987) constructed two series, one
of them for the years 1788-97 and another for the 1753-1820 period. He
used, in the second case, the accounts of the central Treasuries, source 3.
The same archival source was consulted by Jacques Barbier and Herbert S.
Klein (1985) to estimate the volume of public expenditure for the 1760-1788
period. Renate Pieper used source 4 constructing the sixth series for the
period from 1753 to 1780. This source has also been used by José Jurado-
Sánchez (2006) to compile several statistics of volume and structure of
public spending, but his estimate covers the 1714-1800 era, that is to say the
whole century except the first thirteen years.
In our view, until the work of José Jurado-Sánchez was published there
were no acceptable statistics which would allow us to know with a degree
of certainty the volume and the structure of Spain’s Treasury spending and
its fluctuations, the aims and role of Spanish Public Finance and to analy-
se its economic effects. It had also been impossible to carry out internatio-
nal comparisons for the whole of the eighteenth century like those made in
this work. Considered jointly, the six estimates made between 1969 and
1988 leave much to be desired. Their authors did not calculate figures for
thirty years of the first half of the century and statistics made for the second
half present very different results. If 1760 is taken as an example, we can see
that for this year four estimates have been made and all of them present
large differences. The figure calculated by Merino (1987) is three times gre-
ater than that of Ozanam and one and half times more than that presented
by Barbier and Klein and Pieper. The same can be said as for other years
(see Jurado-Sánchez, 2006, Tables II.2 and II.3, pp. 31-33). These enormous
differences are due to several factors: difficulties in the use of archive mate-
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rials, the diverse primary sources upon which estimates are based, inade-
quate data processing and the fact that five sets of data have been cons-
tructed at current prices and only one (that of Barbier and Klein) at cons-
tant prices. Therefore, the abovementioned six series are very different esti-
mates which cover various periods of the eighteenth century, are not com-
parable and it is very difficult to integrate them into a single homogeneous
series. There is no doubt that the estimates made by Jurado-Sánchez mar-
kedly improve the statistics of Spanish public spending at our disposal.
There are several powerful reasons for choosing his statistics in order to
achieve the aims of this work. Firstly, it is the only series which covers prac-
tically the whole eighteenth century. The other estimates cover only a part
of the century, that of Merino (1987), which is the longest, includes data for
48 years. In the second place, Jurado-Sánchez used the optimal archive
source: the accounts of central treasurers of the Exchequer audited by the
Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas. It is true that Kamen, at least in part, and
Pieper also used this source, but only to estimate public spending for 16 and
28 years of the century respectively. In addition, the Jurado-Sánchez series
not only covers the whole of the eighteenth century and is based on the best
archival source, but it has also been compiled with adequate data proces-
sing and has been deflated with the optimal index prices. Barbier and Klein
also constructed their series at constant prices and with adequate data pro-
cessing, but their estimate only covers 29 years of the century. In the follo-
wing Table the statistics used in this article are presented, i.e. the public
spending series constructed by Jurado-Sánchez for Spain and Mitchell and
Deane for Britain.
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Sources: The author’s own preparation based on the data series of Mitchell and Deane (1962) and
Jurado-Sánchez (2006).
Notes: British figures in 000 pound sterling at constant prices. Spanish figures in 000 reales of vellón
at constant prices. R: Cumulative growth rate.
Year Britain Spain Year Britain Spain
1714 6,005 172,933 1758 12,453 188,303
1715 5,988 155,149 1759 15,382 261,574
1716 7,147 173,195 1760 18,360 263,241
1717 6,195 203,042 1761 22,460 392,394
1718 6,832 186,896 1762 21,319 287,711
1719 6,342 200,697 1763 17,723 234,265
1720 5,884 231,263 1764 10,476 210,437
1721 5,873 221,735 1765 11,337 225,626
1722 7,585 187,019 1766 9,639 207,876
1723 6,372 170,606 1767 8,842 212,174
1724 5,785 170,602 1768 8,469 222,946
1725 5,687 200,796 1769 9,666 189,104
1726 5,434 189,791 1770 10,524 234,670
1727 6,104 219,709 1771 9,445 236,671
1728 6,570 234,171 1772 9,167 200,373
1729 5,491 236,457 1773 8,384 184,002
1730 5,867 204,490 1774 8,247 207,342
1731 6,076 229,658 1775 9,173 233,246
1732 5,589 233,768 1776 12,320 254,621
1733 5,406 226,345 1777 14,129 249,013
1734 7,227 220,157 1778 15,333 269,771
1735 6,575 219,857 1779 17,760 219,925
1736 6,659 234,972 1780 20,550 288,736
1737 5,515 176,470 1781 22,443 291,326
1738 5,192 163,649 1782 25,202 346,623
1739 5,854 196,426 1783 18,225 336,962
1740 6,161 169,510 1784 19,242 267.070
1741 6,841 208,372 1785 21,527 239,050
1742 8,619 227,304 1786 14,267 213,372
1743 9,552 254,599 1787 13,234 235,308
1744 11,188 247,217 1788 13,502 240,273
1745 10,494 270,925 1789 13,691 207,903
1746 10,542 281,687 1790 13,547 223,940
1747 12,726 212,992 1791 14,873 282,603
1748 12,705 194,992 1792 13,896 269,201
1749 13,067 190,679 1793 15,212 237,067
1750 7,563 168,245 1794 21,107 315,126
1751 7,139 221,741 1795 26,528 399,251
1752 7,567 243,837 1796 27,514 351,393
1753 6,613 185,805 1797 38,952 271,974
1754 6,700 187,060 1798 32,042 320,316
1755 7,738 183,206 1799 29,637 555,772
1756 10,423 248,347 1800 23,364 329,989
1757 10,288 224,920 R: 1.47 R: 0.46
